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I'« v|RA- Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act 
Respondents/Intervenors-Appellees Alton Coal Development, LLC ("Alton"), the 
permittee of Coal Hollow Mine Permit No. C/025/0005 ("Mine Permit"), and Kane 
County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, through its attorneys pursuant to Flule 
24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure submit this joint brief in opposition to the 
opening brief of Petitioners/Appellants Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Park 
Conservation Association (collectively, "Petitioners") filed July 1, 2011 .' The Decision 
of the Board upholding the mine permit should be affirmed for the reasons set forth 
herein. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 40-10-14(6)(a), 40-10-30(3), 
and63G-4-403(l). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This case involves the approval of a permit to mine coal on private land in Kane 
County, Utah, issued by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Division") and 
upheld over Petitioners' challenge by the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the 
"Board"). The dispute involves the measures taken by the State and Alton to identify 
and evaluate two types of resources subject to possible effects from coal mining: cultural 
and historic resources and water resources. Petitioners' appeal of the Board's decision 
asks the Supreme Court to determine (1) whether the permit applicant, Alton, provided 
sufficient information concerning these resources to the Division in support of its 
1
 Counsel for Kane County has authorized filing this joint brief on the County's behalf. 
In this context "cultural and historic resources" is a term of art that refers broadly to 
prehistoric objects, structures, and sites as well as those of lesser antiquity. 
1 
application for a surface coal mining permit; (2) whether the Division adequately 
documented its reasons for approving the permit; and (3) whether the Board provided 
approval. 
Judicial i e\ iew of 1:1 le Boai d" s decisions regarding pern lits for coal n in lit ig 
operations is governed by section 30 of the Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act 
("I JCMR A") ai id by the Utah Administrative Procedure- Act ("T!APA"\ .See T Jtah Code 
§ § • • ' ?* 
The language of UCMRA vests considerable discretion m the Board to anph its 
provisions, wJ , .. .A: . . *.;u.i- . • s».*i ,^.UAC ICK-IKC ;u ihe 
Board's decisions upon, judicial review. See LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 U'l ' 41,215 
P.3d 135 at m ? I;MI example the Boards interpretation*, and applications of lr*v under 
I JCMR - •! -• . . , \ i • \ . .. i i - - f - -1-' 
UCMK \ s statement of legislate e purpose includes explicit jjiants ol discrete u- MK 
exclusive wsv,^ .*- .v.
 r m d mining on state and pri.ate land); § 40- 10- ^ M - B<^ inJ 
should exercise ...s ;..;! i eacl i of state constiiuiioi.til powers" to regulate coal i i linii ig). 
The Board's powers and fiinctions under UCMRA further evidence intent to allow broad 
discretion, including discretion in promulgating rules, establishing standards and 
other actions retroactively or otherwise within the purposes of thi i hapter as n lay be 
necessary to enforce [UCMRA's] provision > i; ^slature specified that 
the Board be composed of citizens with specific expertise, further evidencii ig ii itei it to 
vest considerable discretion therein. See § 40-6-4(2) (members to be individually 
"knowledgeable" in mining, environmental, oil and gas, or royalty interest matters). 
Accordingly, on judicial review, the Board's interpretations of UMCRA and its own 
rules, together with the Board's applications of the statute and rules to the facts, should 
be affirmed unless the Board has abused its discretion by interpreting or applying the law 
in an unreasonable and irrational manner. Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 76, 
226P.3d719at^l4. 
Issue 1: Did the Board err in concluding that the permit appliceition contained the 
required information regarding cultural and historic resources in the Coal Hollow Mine's 
"adjacent area"? 
Standard of Review: Whether the Division evaluated the mine's effects on 
cultural and historic resources in the adjacent area is a question of fact, which the Court 
reviews under a substantial evidence standard of review. Utah Code §§ 40-10-30(3)(f), 
63G-4-403(4)(g). Whether the Board properly found that the Division completed its 
required consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer ("SHPO") is a question 
of law, which the Court reviews for correctness. Utah Code § 63G-4-403(4)(d). Whether 
the Board correctly agreed with the Division that historic resources in the Town of 
Panguitch, some 30 miles from the mine, lay beyond its jurisdiction is a question of law, 
which the Court reviews for correctness. JdL; see Assoc. Gen. Contr. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, 38 P.3d 291 at ^ 18 (applying rational basis review when the 
Board interprets the operative provisions of law it administers). 
Issue 2: Did the Board err in concluding that the Division's permit approval was 
based on an adequate Cumulative Hydrologic Impact Assessment? 
3 
S t a n d a r d of Review: 1 he Board's conclusion that the Division's Cumulative 
Hydrologic Impact Assessment ("CTTTA"^ adequately demonstrated that the mine had 
the facts in .il area specifically implicating the agency's expertise. Assoc. Gen. 
Contr. at n i ? . cnsci issed abo\ e, ti le Boai d ai id Di \ ision oneraf anua \;\ 
grants of discretion pursuant to UCMRA. In addition to these explicit grants, i -hey 
factors support affording particular deference to this determination as an imp!a it grant of 
disc letii in See IVIaiidel.lv. I ax Conn i i' n, 2008 \ 1 1 3 1 186 I " 3< 1 3 3 5 at H 1 t ' ,i i JI: t.< 
Board found l\w> the facK analv/.ed h\ \h< < ^vision are complex, dealing will* ^, 
intei ; 1^ Ai i -.; v »• *'! i) • - .^u>g\ 
5613 i . *,
 A^; M/(MIH1 ihe Roard^ Hn:»i f>nlrr m:ik- U apparent th.«' *!*• »vMtjvr 
expertise, credi »ni\, <uid depth o. understanding oi tlu witnesses on this topic , >m^ :d a 
sig: • ' r- ! * J i % P ! M ' : "1 lii < I. tl \t B< >an i s 
statutor •*«!*: iv : lah s e \ p u i ,iulhun(v u< 'Mis area, together with the mandate rial 
to vest considerable discretion in the Board. See Utah Code §§ 40-6-4(2) (expertise of 
Board members), : 10 10 30(3) ( ji idicial review). A* »ii ?f • r n K idi: ite standard of i e\ iew 
affording significant deference to the Board's decision L-> \p-^- ^riate, under which the 
Board's decision should be upheld unless it exceeds the houiuK of reasonableness., even if 
t h i s l • • .: 
1 he Board s ()rder concluding that I t MR v am: ihe B.-ard\ rules do I M requite 
designatioi .;enal damage criteria" m a * • • \ presents question., of in ic ;p i \un^n 
of agency-specific statutes and regulations. I 'his Court reviews those interpretations 
A 
under an intermediate standard of review, setting aside the agency's interpretations only 
if they are unreasonable or irrational. Sierra Club at f 14. 
Issue 3: Did the Board err in finding that Alton's hydrologic monitoring plan for 
the mine adequately describes how data will be used to determine the mine's effects on 
the hydrologic balance. 
Standard of Review: The sufficiency of the hydrologic monitoring plan presents 
a mixed question of law and fact involving the Division's and Board's application of law 
to the facts under an explicit grant of discretion. LPI Services at f^l| 7-8. The Legislature 
has explicitly placed the contents, procedures and requirements for permit application 
materials, including the monitoring plan, within the Division's and Board's discretion. 
See § 40-10-6(4) (powers, functions, and duties include establishing procedures and 
requirements for permit applications). Accordingly, significant deference is appropriate 
in determining the sufficiency of the monitoring plan, and the decision should not be 
disturbed so long as it has a rational basis. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following determinative provisions are set forth verbatim at Addendum 1-7. 
Utah Code § 9-8-301, 302, 404 (historic preservation) 
Utah Code § 40-10-2 (exclusive jurisdiction) 
Utah Code § 40-10-3(20) (coal mining operations) 
Utah Code § 40-10-6(4) (Division's authority to set procedure) 
Utah Code § 40-10-10(2)(c)(i)(B),(C) (baseline data), (CHIA) 
Utah Code § 40-10-1 l(2)(c) (CHIA) 
Utah Code § 40-10-30(4) (standard for judicial review) 
5 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-411.140, 141.1, 142, 144 (cultural resource rules) 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-724 (baseline data) 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-729.100 (rvuA\ 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-731.200, 21 l: .1 L.\ 220. 2^1, 222 (monitoring data, plan) 
Utah Adi i • 11 > Code R645-100-200 (adjacent area), (coal mining operations) 
30 L '• I (state programs) 
30 U.S.^. v? 12;>J (exclusive jurisdiction) 
30 C.F.R " 733 (federal oversight) 
3 • .. . . 
£ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners' complaint in this case is about the paperwork that necessarily 
accompanies the State of Utah's review of the application for the mining permit for the 
Coal Hollow Mine. It is, at best, only tangentially about the environmental impacts of the 
mine itself. Petitioners ask the Court to set aside the permit approval and instruct the 
State to demand further information from the applicant, conduct further analysis of the 
information, and prepare even more detailed paperwork explaining its reasons for 
approving the permit application. 
Alton, the permittee and mine operator respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Petitioners' appeal. During an extensive hearing before the Board, Petitioners failed to 
prove any error or deficiency in the Division's approval of the Mine Permit, nor did they 
demonstrate any actual or threatened harm to the environment. The Division's approval, 
in turn, was based on its own thorough review of the eight-volume permit application, 
spanning a review period of almost two years, including ample opportunity for public 
review and comment. The thorough vetting required the applicant to identify all 
resources, cultural, hydrologic, or otherwise, of significance both within its permit area, 
and near the mine when an effect on the resource was likely. 
In this appeal, as before the Board, Petitioners failed to prove, or even attempt to 
prove, that any resource in or near the mine had been overlooked. Petitioners did not 
prove, or attempt to prove, that the effect on any identified resource had been 
miscalculated. In contrast, the record contains ample evidence of the reasoning 
supporting the Division's and Board's appropriate choices regarding the resources and 
impacts requiring assessment, and how to assess those impacts. 
7 
Petitioners' case relies on their own unsupported theories of law, which they 
allege to be mandated by non-binding federal interpretive materials. 1 1 lere is sii nply no 
basis for substit itiii is Petition - ' readings of these non-binding materials for the 
clear provisions of' 1) tali's Coal Program. Utah is a primacy state for coal mine 
coal mining, subject to federal oversight, but not federal control. In every issue raised by 
Petitioners, the provisions of I Jta1I'S program set forth the appropriate legal standards and 
this Coi irt need look no further than their unambiguous pro^ isions Because the Division 
and Board faithfully observed these standards, and applied them to the facts in a 
reasonable manii* • \\\v :ippio\ [(| .<! llir mmr jvnvnl sltm Id !«i iiplu'td. 
L NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioners appeal undei 1:1 le "I JCMR , \ ai id I I VI }.i \ I Ital Code §§ 40- 10 30( 1); 
63G-4-403. They challenge the order of the Board upholding the decision of the Division 
granting to Alton a surface coal mining permit for the Coal Hollow Mine. Pursuant to 
UCMR ' -• foi i e • iei s 'ing coal i nil ill ig permit applicatioi is, 
receiving public comment, and determining the adequacy of applications, \ Jtah Code 
§§ " :K) Ill) 6 , 11 13 I • :> c)l: tail :i tl le appi o \ al i lecessary tc coi ldi i ::t si 11 fac e coal i i lii lii ig 
operations Alton first submitted its multiple volume permit application to the Division for 
review in 2007 (R I I:i g. Ex Dl ; it £009' (31 J' I GOING 10192009\0001.pdf, setting Iu>U 
the chronology of the permit application. Addendum u . ; i nib nunc it \ .iicu on 635 
acres of private land approximately three miles south of Alton, Utah. (R. 5593 f^lj 3 7 -
analysis of the mine's impact on fish and wildlife, topsoil and subsoil, hydrology, 
8 
vegetation and air quality. (R. Hrg. Ex. D8 (Technical Analysis evaluating Alton's 
submissions in each of these areas. The entire Permit Application appears in Hrg. Ex. Dl 
at /Coal Hollow/MRP.) After Alton submitted additional application materials, the 
Division found the application to be complete and began its technical review in 2008. (R. 
Hrg. Ex. Dl at \2009\OUTGOING\10192009\0001.pdf.) The Division held an informal 
conference in the Town of Alton on June 16, 2008, to receive additional public comment 
and accepted follow-up written comments thereafter. Id, The Division's technical staff 
completed its review and issued its Technical Analysis explaining its findings supporting 
approval of the application on October 19, 2009. The Division approved the Mine Permit 
at that time. Id. 
Pursuant to the UCMRA and rules promulgated by the Board, Petitioners sought 
the Board's review of the Division's determination, through a Request for Agency Action 
and Request for a Hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-10-14; Utah Admin. Code R645-
300-200. (R. 1.) Petitioners alleged that the Division overlooked at least thirty-two 
deficiencies in Alton's permit application. (R. 10-14.) By the time the Board held 
hearings on the matter, Petitioners had narrowed the focus of their allegations to 
seventeen issues. (R. 1409.) 
The Board hearing began as a formal adjudication on December 8, 2009. After 
considering various pre-hearing motions and providing opportunity for discovery, the 
Board heard testimony over several days in April and June, of 2010. (R. 5585.) It then 
accepted final post-hearing briefs and closed the record in this matter on June 23, 2010. 
(R. 5585. Transcripts of the hearings are at R. 5876-85.) An interim order announcing 
its decision was entered by the Board on August 3, 2010. (R. 5454. Addendum 13.) At 
9 
the Boat d 's re uic Division filed proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on October 6, 2010.3 (R. 5490.) I he Board received Peti t ioner 's 
objections to tl le pi oposed fii id" u |M • i vf f ;,::|IIJ f • ;ii id con1 hlQ'u 1 }i : • I lit1 ^  ' ai id ei itered a fii lal 
order on November 22, 2010. (R ^ ^ Addendum ! The Final Order upholds the 
Division 's decision and grants tin, '*l.i*. ;" I i lit to . . 5638.) Petitioners appealed 
that -il in J hi
 ti si, ; wniui was denied by the Board and this Court. (R. 5553, 
5675 ) < J»n appeal, Petitioner now focus on three issues—whether the Division 
the area adjacent to the mine; whether the Board erred in concluding that the Divis ion 's 
CI IL V satisfied the requirements -; i;,. :»;;. •. *m\ rogram and ilic Hoard s rules; and 
whether the Board erred in concluding IIKU Al ton 's Hydrologic Monitoring Plan is 
adequate under the Board ' s rules. (Petr 's Br. at 1 3 ) 
IL • S T A T E M E N T 
The Coal Hollow Mine is located in Kane County, Utah. Its permit area consists 
town of Alton. \11 of the coal included in the permit area is privately owned and leased 
to Alton. Production of coal li oi i I tl le i i ii:i le began in December 2010 in ider the permit at 
issue in this appeal.4 
In their Addendum accompanying their Opening Brief, Petitioners mistakenly identify 
these proposed findings as the Board ' s Final Order. The Final Order, with Findings and 
Conclusions as adopted by the Board, is at R. 5585. (Addendum 11.) 
Separate from the permit at issue here, Alton has applied for a federal coal lease from 
the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management which is preparing an 
environmental impact statement ("EIS") for that action. If the federal government offers 
the coal for competitive leasing, and if Alton submits the winning bid, Alton may file a 
new permit application with the Division to develop nearby federal coal deposits. This 
Both Kane County and the Town of Alton have expressed support for the mine, 
recognizing the importance of mining to its economic vitality. The Kane County General 
Plan states that "[t]he mining industry makes up an important part of the property tax 
base of the County, and its payroll and expenditures for supplies are important to the 
economic stability of the County." 
With that background, Alton sets forth the specific factual background relevant to 
the issues on appeal. 
A. The Coal Hollow Mine Will Not Have An Adverse Impact on Cultural 
and Historic Resources Outside the Permit Area-
The Division has responsibility to protect historic and prehistoric properties 
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places from the effects of mining, 
whether or not the property is actually listed. Utah Code §§ 9-8-302(10), 404(1 )(a)(i). 
There are no known prehistoric structures, rock art, or human remains in the Sink Valley 
area where the Coal Hollow Mine is located. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl 1, D17, D19.) However, a 
series of resource inventories commissioned by Alton concluded that the Sink, Valley in 
and near the mine site was the prehistoric location of summer campsites supporting 
hunting or food-gathering activities. Id. Consistent with this conclusion, the "historic 
properties" identified in the inventories consisted of fire-cracked rocks, chips from tool 
making, projectile points, or potsherds, lying on the ground singly or in groups. Id. 
Certain of these sites were deemed eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic 
Places under Criterion "D" which indicates any degree of potential for recovering 
information about history or prehistory. (R. Hrg. Ex. D16 at 20-27. Addendum 14.) For 
federal action (and its accompanying EIS) is not at issue in these proceedings involving 
the permit for a mine located on private lands. 
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any eligible site that would be disturbed by mining operations, the Division approved a 
data recovery and mitigation plan to assure that the site's potential to yield information 
v oi ild be presei \ eel (See, e.g,? R I Irg. Ex Dl I ) 
Separate from these properties located at or near the mine site, the Panguitch 
Natioi lal I listoi ic Disti let coi isists of arcl titecturally-significant historic, institutional, 
commercial, and residential buildings abutting I f S Highway 89. (R. Hrg. Ex. D16 at 
26.) I he District is approximately 30 miles from the mine site (R. 5603 ^j 94 96.) 
with any public road, the trucks will share the highway with other commercial traffic now 
makh ig i lse of tl mt i oad Id. 
B. The Coal Hollow Mine Was Designed To Prevent Material Dam o 
the Hydrologic Balance 
1 •'' tail is \ er>< fevs x\ atei i e soi n ces. 
Lower Robinson Creek, one oi :\\o surface water features, crosses the northwest corner 
< ihe permit area, flowing from northeast to southwest until it reaches Kanab Creek 
about a mile west of the mine <i< I Irg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\< w1 I 
025005\Volume 7.pdf, App. 7 Addendum 1 c\) It is ephemeral in most oi ii> reach."' 
Id. 1 1 ic i i lajorit;; ' of tl le i i ill le ai "a lies son ill least of I ow : n: R obii: ISOI i Ci: c ek 1| \ ill lint i tl i c 
drainage of Sink Valley Wash, which is ephemeral until it reaches Kanab Creek 
nppmvniulclv MI • mill - suiilli I flic pcrimi .itea Id 1 here are no rivers, lakes, or 
perennial streams in the mine area. Id, 
5
 An ephemeral stream is usually dry, Ilowing only in response to precipitation or 
snowmelt. 
i o 
There are no significant aquifers in the strata around and immediately beneath the 
mine. Id. A small amount of groundwater originates on the slopes of the Paunsaugunt 
Plateau east of the mine and makes its way through unconsolidated sediments into the 
eastern part of Sink Valley where the mine is located. Id. This shallow alluvial 
groundwater percolates westward until it is forced to the surface in a cluster of seeps and 
springs by a buried ridge of impermeable rock. Id. Under most circumstances, this water 
evaporates without reaching Sink Valley Wash or Kanab Creek. Id. 
In considering how the mine could affect these water resources, Alton identified 
the potential for mining operations to interact with shallow alluvial groundwater as the 
probable hydrologic consequence ("PHC") of mining, and described three mechanisms 
by which that might occur. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 
025005\Volume 7.pdf at 7-24 through 7-44. Addendum 16.) The mine was designed to 
avoid these effects by first, reducing the eastward extent of the mine pits and second, by 
providing a contingency plan for installing impermeable barriers if groundwater flows 
increase. Id. Potential degradation of surface water (originating on the mine site as 
storm runoff) is prevented because the mine design includes impoundments where all 
runoff will be captured and evaporated. Id. Finally, the mining operations are designed 
to quickly backfill mined areas with low-permeability fill materials to eliminate any 
adverse impact related to post-mining migration of groundwater. IdL 
C. Alton CoaPs Hydrologic Monitoring Plan Is Effective and Thorough 
During mining operations, Alton is under an obligation to continuously monitor 
surface water and ground water. Utah Admin. Code R645-301-731.200. To meet this 
responsibility, Alton Coal developed a robust hydrologic monitoring plan. (R. Hrg. Ex., 
13 
Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, p 7 57 the mgh i 59, 
Tables 7-4 through 7-7B. Addendum 1G ^ Depending on the source, these monitoring 
various stations set forth in the plan and approved by the Division, and by comparing 
those monitoring results with tlle data obtained through the various methodologies 
described in the permit application, Alton and the Division can detect whether 
operations are causing a negative impact on water quantity or quality. 
A lion sjH t ilini 'vl mnmloi ini> Mil's -ipiviHl thiuti, \\M\\\ ll • pcinnl area aihl culjai s ml 
area. (K. Hrg. Ex. 1)1 at \Coat Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, Table 
7 -^  I) W i i ' 111 | m 11, | \ 11 K»ng ol her i i lonitoring sites, Lower Robinson Creek will be 
monitored both above and below the permit area. Id. Sink Valley Wash, though 
normally dry, will nevertheless be monitored immediately below the permit area and at a 
location further downstreai i i v • it! lit i its i :i laiit i di aii mge ai e a I d Eigl it differei it spi ings 
originating in the shallow alluvial groundwater system will be monitored, as will three 
springs rlsnvhui, mil Sink Viilln lull ' ill HI sill ill1 i in iriuloi iiiiiitlivii wells Id assess 
changes in g roundwate r levels Id. 
In .iddiliuii lo cont inuously compar ing newly-ob ta ined wa te r data to p re -min ing 
conditions, Alton's permit application sets forth a number of scientific methodologies 
that, combined with its reporting obligations, will provide for adequate detectioii of 
changes in \\,:t1tT njiialih caused In immm> operation1, Minn IIMI! tsich nl 11u s» inrlhtMU 
to assess the pre-mining baseline hydrologic data in preparing its permit application. 
W hile i lot i i lai idatoi y, tl lese methods i i lay be employed by the hydrologist to help 
determine the mine's hydrologic effects from the monitoring data collected during and 
after mining. 
First, Stiff Diagrams may be used to evaluate the potential source and path of 
contaminants in groundwater. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 
025005\Volume 7.pdf, at 7-7, 7-8, 7-13 and Appx 7-1, Fig. 14.) Second, degradation of 
water quality in areas down-gradient from the permit area may be detected by applying 
graphical techniques described in the application to specific conductance measurements 
obtained through operational monitoring. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal 
Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf at 7-7, DWG. 7-5.pdf.) Third, the Palmer Hydrologic 
Drought Index 0WPHDI") may be used to determine whether changes in water quantity 
are the result of natural climatic changes or the result of other influences such as mining. 
(R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, App. 7-1 p. 
7.) Fourth, Alton provided a detailed discussion of the geochemistry of the solutes in 
surface and groundwater which may, if needed, allow the user to evaluate how specific 
and identified water quality parameters may change as a result of mining activities. Id. at 
13-15. Fifth, Alton has stated in the permit application that increases in magnesium, 
sulfate, total dissolved solids, or certain other ions in diverted alluvial groundwater would 
be indicative of excessive and unanticipated interaction between groundwater and the 
Tropic Shale. Id. at 37. Sixth, Alton has identified the typical flow rates and water 
depths of the wells and water rights in the permit area to facilitate comparison of baseline 
data with current information collected via the monitoring plan. Id at Table 7-12. 
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Based on the foregoing facts—and the completeness of Alton's application in all 
other regards—both the Division and the Board granted Alton the permit to operate the 
Coal Hollow Mine. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioners' arguments on appeal fall into two categories. First, they urge the 
Court to ignore Utah's legal primacy in coal mining regulation by substituting non-
binding federal interpretive positions for the standards laid out in Utah statutes and rules 
governing hydrologic assessment and monitoring. Second, Petitioners' invite the Court 
to substitute its judgment for the rational choices made by the Division and Board in 
determining what type of criteria, how much detail, and which particular locations must 
be a part of the water-resource documentation accompanying a permit application. Even 
if the Court were so inclined, the invitation is incompatible with the appropriate standard 
of review. 
Before the Board, Alton identified the relevant legal standards appearing in the 
Utah Coal Program6 that controlled Petitioners' claims related to cultural resources and 
hydrology. The Board found that Petitioners had not demonstrated that these legal 
standards had been violated by the Division's permit approval. Even on appeal, 
Petitioners decline to directly challenge the Board's reasons and merely ask to impose 
their own interpretation of the applicable law. 
6
 The "Utah Coal Program" consists of the Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act found 
at chapter 10 of Title 40 of the Utah Code, and the rules promulgated by the Board 




III. THE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DIVISION 
GAVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO CULTURAL AND HISTORIC 
RESOURCES 
To assure that the Division could meet its historic preservation responsibilities, 
Alton commissioned a series of cultural resource inventories of the area where the mine 
would be located. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl 1, D17, D19. Addendum 14.) Together, these surveys 
examined a total of 3,977 acres including the entire 635-acre private parcel comprising 
the permit area in this matter.7 (R. Hrg. Ex. D16 at 20-27.) The surveys located 91 sites 
deemed eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. Id The vast 
majority consisted of "lithic scatters," groups of small artifacts, or prehistoric campsites 
not apparent except through searching. No prehistoric structures were found Id. 
Once the nature and location of these resources were known, the Division 
prepared its list of sites that would be affected by the proposed mining, and sent the list to 
the State Historic Preservation Officer ("SHPO") for concurrence, which he provided. 
(R. Hrg. Ex. D12. Addendum 17.) All of these sites were located either wholly or partly 
within the permit boundaries. Id. For sites that could not be avoided in the mining plan, 
Alton prepared mitigation and data recovery plans which also received SHPO 
concurrence. (R. Hrg. Ex. D14.) These data recovery and mitigation operations were 
completed before the sites were disturbed by mining. 
The Division did not require and Alton did not obtain a Cultural Resource Inventory 
covering any locations in the Town of Panguitch. The Division determined that 
considering historic properties at such a distance from the mine exceeded its jurisdiction 
over "coal mining and reclamation operations" as defined at R645-100-200. 
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The Board found that the Division had properly accounted for all cultural 
resources that would be affected by the proposed operations. (R. 5595-5603.) The 
following sections explain that (1) substantial evidence supports the finding that all 
affected sites within or adjacent to the mine permit area were considered; (2) substantial 
evidence also supports the finding that the SHPO provided necessary concurrence with 
the Division; and (3) the Board did not commit legal error by determining that the Utah 
Coal Program did not mandate evaluation of historic resources in the Town of Panguitch. 
The first two issues apply the Board's definition of the term ''adjacent area" while the 
third also implicates the definition of "coal mining and reclamation operations." 
A. Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the Division 
considered effects on cultural resources in both the permit area and 
adjacent area. 
The record before the Board shows that the Division fulfilled its responsibility to 
evaluate cultural and historic resources in the permit and adjacent area that would be 
affected by the mine operations. Under Utah's historic preservation statute the Division 
must "take into account" the project's effects on any historic property and provide a 
written evaluation of the effect on such property to the SHPO. Utah Code § 9-8-
404(1 )(a). An historic property is any site or structure that is eligible for listing on the 
National Register of Historic Places. § 9-8-302(10). In the parlance of the Utah Coal 
Program, these historic properties are known as "cultural and historic resources." See 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-411.140. The Division, and not the SHPO, is responsible 
for all final determinations regarding resources that are affected by the mining operations. 
Utah Code § 9-8-404(1 )(a)(i). (R. Hrg. Ex. D13 (letter from SHPO to Division).) 
10 
The Board's rules for permit approval set forth the means by which the Division 
will fulfill this responsibility when approving a coal mine permit. First, the permit 
applicant must supply maps that clearly show, inter alia, "the locations of any cultural or 
historic resources . . . and known archaeological sites within the permit and adjacent 
areas." R645-301-411.141.1 (emphasis supplied). Second, the applicant must "present 
evidence of clearances by the SHPO." R645-301-411.142. Third, for every site that may 
be adversely affected, the plan must describe how effects will be prevented or mitigated, 
as the Division requires. R645-301-411.142, 411.144. Significantly, while the required 
maps must show the locations of the affected resources, there is no separate requirement 
to depict the boundaries of the permit or adjacent areas on such a map. 
As mentioned, accounting for cultural resources is not confined to the "permit 
area" but applies equally to the "adjacent area." R645-301-411.141.1. "Permit area" 
and "adjacent area" are terms of art for purposes of the Utah Coal Program. "Permit 
area" means the area that must be bonded and reclaimed, corresponding to where mining 
operations will disturb the surface. R645-100-200. 
"Adjacent area" means the area outside the permit area where a resource or 
resources, determined according to the context in which adjacent area is used, are 
or reasonably could be expected to be adversely impacted by proposed coal 
mining and reclamation operations, including probable impacts from underground 
workings. 
Id. The adjacent area extends no further than the reach of coal mining operations that 
might affect it and necessarily depends on the nature of the anticipated effects. 
Accordingly, if an historic property is unlikely to be affected by coal mining operations, 
it is located outside the adjacent area by definition, and need not be depicted on any map. 
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The Board found that every site lying beyond the permit boundaries and likely to 
be affected by mining was evaluated by the Division and cleared by the SHPO. (R. 
5600-5601 Tfi| 74-83.) Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding. Alton 
provided the Division with maps depicting every eligible site discovered in its cultural 
resource inventories, whether or not any effect was expected. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl 1 at 3; D16 
at 4; D17 at 4; D19 at 4. Addendum 14.) Alton provided a map of all sites it expected to 
affect, from which the Division created the list it provided to SHPO. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl 1 at 
3, R. Hrg. Ex. D12. Addendum 17.) These actions satisfy the plain language of the rules 
to account for sites in the permit and adjacent areas. See R645-301-411.141.1. 
The list of sites evaluated by the Division included those located entirely within 
the permit boundary, and all sites that were located on both sides of the permit boundary. 
Under the definitions, this latter group of sites is located in both the permit area and 
adjacent area. Daron Haddock, the Division's permitting supervisor, testified that these 
sites located in the adjacent area on the permit boundary were evaluated for eligibility 
and effect. (R. 5880 at 187:17-190:16; R. 5881 at 314:25-315:5, 317:15-318:3. 
Addendum 18.) His uncontroverted testimony before the Board established the rationale 
used by the Division to determine whether sites would be affected. He explained that the 
Division concluded that any site located entirely beyond the permit boundary was 
unlikely to be adversely impacted. (R. 5880 at 201:15-202:14.) Because surface 
disturbance is the only expected means of adverse impact, and because surface 
disturbance must be confined to the permit area, sites located some distance from the 
permit area are not subject to any foreseeable effect of "coal mining and reclamation 
operations." (R. 5880 at 203:2-12, 205:2-206:1.) His testimony disclosed that the 
on 
Division considered off-permit adverse effects to cultural resources from stormwater 
drainage or blowing dust to be unlikely. (R. 5881 at 274:6-275:20, 329:8-17.) 
Petitioners offered no evidence on the likelihood of adverse impacts to any cultural or 
historic site. The Board summarized this information in ten separate findings of fact 
which are not challenged by Petitioners on appeal. (R. 5600-01 Tft[ 74-83.) 
It is undisputed that the Division ultimately evaluated the mine's effects on 17 
sites, and the SHPO ultimately concurred with the Division's evaluation. It is undisputed 
that this exchange included every affected site within the permit area. It is also 
undisputed that the evaluation included every additional affected site, regardless of its 
location. Because some of these sites were located, at least partially, in an area beyond 
the permit boundaries, they are evidence of consideration of sites in the adjacent area. 
Accordingly, the Board's factual finding should not be disturbed. 
Petitioners' challenge to the Board's factual finding number 89 is oblique at best. 
Rather than identifying cultural resources in the adjacent area that were omitted from 
proper Division-SHPO consultation, or from the required maps and narratives, they 
complain only that the Board gave the Division a "pass" on delineating the borders of 
what it considered to be the adjacent area.9 The Division's responsibility, however, is to 
The Board identifies paragraph 89 of its Final Order as a legal conclusion rather than a 
factual finding. Petitioners challenge none of the Board's factual findings on this issue 
set forth in the Final Order paragraphs 74 through 83. Accordingly, the Board's factual 
findings should not be disturbed. 
9
 The Board articulated a rational basis for rejecting this argument: "Ultimately, the 
Board can find no fault in the approach followed by the Division . . . . There may be other 
methods that could have been employed that would have yielded a plottable line or shape 
on a map [to indicate the adjacent area] but such methods would not have resulted in the 
inclusion of any additional sites in the Division's determination of eligibility and effect, 
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evaluate resources, not draw lines on a map, and the record supports the Board's finding 
that every cultural or historic resource located where it might be affected by the mine 
operations was evaluated and identified to the SHPO. Whether the Division identified an 
adjacent area separate and apart from the resources that might be affected is quite simply 
beside the point. Petitioners' semantic argument is no answer to the substantial evidence 
that all sites in the adjacent area were identified on maps as required, and also received 
proper evaluation by the Division. The Board's findings of fact, therefore, should not be 
disturbed. 
B. Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the Division 
obtained the required concurrence from the SHPO regarding cultural 
resources in both the permit area and adjacent area. 
Petitioners seek additional mileage from their semantic argument regarding the 
"adjacent area" by applying it to the requirement that the SHPO concur with the 
Division's determinations regarding how the mine operations will affect cultural or 
historic sites. The Board's rule requires that the permit application shall include evidence 
of the necessary SHPO clearances. R645-301-411.142. Petitioners fail to explain why 
the SHPO clearances appearing in the record fail to support the findings they challenge. 
More fundamental, while Petitioners challenge the Board's finding 81 and 83, they fail to 
come to terms with number 82, wherein the Board explains why the evidence in the 
record supports its conclusion. (R. 5601 |^ 82.) The Board could not have been clearer: 
"The evidence did not establish that any site located wholly outside the permit area 
reasonably can be expected to be adversely impacted by coal mining and reclamation 
would not ultimately have affected the analysis of the issue, and are not mandated by the 
applicable rules." (R. 5458-59. Addendum 13.) 
9 9 
operations. The evidence did not establish that any site other than those identified by the 
Division can reasonably be expected to be adversely impacted by coal mining and 
reclamation operations." Id. In other words, Petitioners simply failed to prove any 
shortcoming in the evaluation of historic properties in the area adjacent to the mine. 
The Division's evaluations and corresponding SHPO concurrences appear in the 
record as hearing exhibits D12, D13, D15, D21, and D22. (Addendum 17.) These 
documents are substantial evidence supporting the Board's factual finding that all known 
eligible sites (regardless of location) were evaluated by the Division and cleared by the 
SHPO. 
Petitioners misapply the law by arguing that the SHPO concurrence did not extend 
to an area beyond the permit boundary, regardless of whether eligible sites were 
identified and evaluated.10 The nexus of the SHPO's authority is only to the affected 
resources, and he is without jurisdiction to regulate how any particular tract or parcel of 
land may or may not be used. See, e.g., Utah Code § 9-8-301(3) (declaring the 
Legislature's intent to balance historic preservation with the lawful and beneficial use of 
lands and natural resources); § 9-8-404(1 )(a) (limiting scope of evaluation and SHPO 
concurrence to "historic properties.") So long as the affected historic properties are 
adequately accounted for by the Division and SHPO, they have fulfilled their mandate. 
Simply put, the pertinent definition requires concurrence from the SHPO only for 
those sites "that may be adversely affected by the proposed coal mining and reclamation 
operations." R645-301 -411.142. Inasmuch as there were no sites beyond those reported 
10
 Petitioners' argument on this point (Petr's Br. at 17) defies logic. If the Division 
evaluated a "site" it must also have evaluated the area where the site was located. 
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to the SHPO that may be "adversely affected", there was no need to obtain SHPO 
concurrence for sites located at any distance beyond the reach of these effects. The 
Board's finding of fact at Paragraph 75 (not challenged by Petitioners) clearly sets out^the 
whole scenario: 
The Division was by these surveys adequately apprised of the historic sites that 
had been identified and their location relative to the permit boundary and was able 
to identify a subset of the identified sites that reasonable could be expected to be 
adversely impacted by coal mining and reclamation operations. These sites were 
either within the permit area or partially within the permit area. Some of these 
sites barely touched the permit boundary and some extended from 220 to 1000 feet 
beyond the permit boundary. 
(R. 5600 |^ 75.) Demand for evaluation and concurrence of an area, whether or not 
historic properties in that area are affected, imposes an unrealistic and unsupported 
burden on the applicant and Division, and expands the jurisdiction of the SHPO well 
beyond its statutory role. Accordingly, the evidence of evaluation and concurrence of all 
eligible sites likely to be affected, regardless of location, must serve as substantial 
evidence supporting the challenged findings of fact. 
C. The Board did not err in refusing to require evidence of SHPO 
concurrences related to the Panguitch National Historic District 
While all "mining and reclamation operations" are strictly confined to the permit 
area at the mine site, Alton indicated in the permit application that it planned to load coal 
from the mine in trucks that would transport it to its destination on the public highways. 
A likely (though not certain) transportation route is on U.S. Highway 89 through the town 
of Panguitch, about 30 road miles from the mine. The plan calls for use of covered 
hopper semi-trailer trucks. Although concerns were raised in public comments about the 
truck's effects on Panguitch's historic structures, the Division determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction to regulate commercial truck traffic on a public highway. (R. Hrg. Ex. D8 at 
100.) 
No provision of the Utah Coal Program mandates consideration of the mine's 
effects on a distant town, when the only "effect" is transportation of coal by common 
carrier on a public highway. The Division's power to regulate mining operations is 
limited to the permit area and the adjacent area, and the town of Panguitch lies within 
neither of these. It is undisputed that Panguitch is outside the permit area. Whether its 
historic resources lie within an adjacent area depends on whether they may reasonably be 
expected to be affected by coal mining and reclamation operations. See R645-100-200 
(definition of "adjacent area"). The Board found, as a matter of law, that the anticipated 
truck transportation was not a "coal mining and reclamation operation" as that term is 
defined in Utah's Coal Program. The term "Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations" 
means 
(a) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal 
mine or, subject to the requirements of Section 40-10-18 of the Act, surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations and surface impacts incident to an underground 
coal mine. . . . Such activities include all activities necessary and incidental to the 
reclamation of the operations, excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal, 
including such common methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, 
box cut, open pit, and area mining; the use of explosives and blasting; in-situ 
distillation; or retorting, leaching, or other chemical or physical processing; and 
the cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation of coal. Such 
activities also include the loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near the 
mine s i t e . . . . ; and (b) the areas upon which the activities described under part (a) 
of this definition occur or where such activities disturb the natural land surface. 
These areas will also include any adjacent land the use of which is incidental to 
any such activities, all lands affected by the construction of new roads or the 
improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of those activities 
and for haulage and excavation, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation 
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shafts, entryways, refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, 
culm banks, tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing 
areas, shipping areas, and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities, or 
other property or material on the surface, resulting from or incident to those 
activities. 
Utah Admin. Code R645-100-200; Utah Code § 40-10-3(20). Mining operations under 
the definition are limited to activities that include or precede loading the coal for 
interstate commerce. Construing the parallel federal definition, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia concluded that use of public highways even if 
incidental to mine access or haulage was not a coal mining operation and refused to 
require that public roads be considered part of the "permit area" and regulated by the 
agency. Harman Mining Corp. v. Office of Surface Mining, 659 F.Supp. 806, 811 
(W.D.Va., 1987). The court's logic is persuasive, noting that the "literal reading" 
advanced by plaintiffs would lead to the absurd result of pulling interstate highways into 
the mine's permit area. Id. The Board found the Harman court's reasoning persuasive. 
(R. 1055-56, 5459-61.) The Board and Division properly declined to assert regulatory 
jurisdiction over common-carrier truck traffic on a public highway a considerable 
distance from the mine site because they found that the rules defining "adjacent area" and 
"coal mining operations" did not support such regulation. Accordingly, the Board found 
that the Town of Panguitch, including its historic district, lay outside the mine's adjacent 
area. Petitioners have shown no legal error in this determination. 
Petitioners do not directly challenge the Board's conclusion of law that the 
commercial trucking operations complained of fall outside the definition of "coal mining 
and reclamation operations." (See R. 5605 %106.) Instead, they assert that the permit is 
fatally flawed because Alton and the Division failed to get the SHPO to "buy off on the 
determination that commercial trucking through Panguitch falls outside the ambit of 
"coal mining and reclamation operations." The argument fails because, without a 
resource that will be affected by coal mining and reclamation operations, there is no state 
agency "undertaking" within the meaning of the SHPO's jurisdictional statute.11 See 
Utah Code § 9-8-404(1). Without a state undertaking, the SHPO is without jurisdiction 
to comment on any resource. Accordingly, there is no legal flaw in the Division's 
treatment of the Panguitch National Historic District, and no reason to disturb its decision 
to grant the permit. 
IV. THE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CHIA WAS 
ADEQUATE 
The Coal Hollow Mine is located on private land in an area with few significant 
water sources. The nearest perennial stream, Kanab Creek, is about a mile west of the 
19 
mine. Lower Robinson Creek is the only surface water resource at the mine site. A dry 
wash through most of its length, the creek gains a small amount of water in and below the 
permit area from seepage which usually reaches Kanab Creek. The groundwater 
resources are equally meager. A limited system of shallow groundwater enters the area 
from the east and emerges at a smattering of springs near the mine's eastern edge. Both 
surface water and groundwater resources are known to be degraded in quality if they have 
contact with the Tropic Shale, the naturally-occurring layer of rock lying just above the 
11
 A more comprehensive review of cultural resources is being prepared in connection 
with the federal lease application. (R. Hrg. Ex. D16 at 1. Addendum 14.). 
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There is no "Upper Robinson Creek." 
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coal seam. (See R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005\Volume 
7.pdf, App. 7-1. Addendum 15.) 
Among other measures, the mine has been designed to prevent damage to the 
water resources outside its boundaries by diverting groundwater before it reaches the 
mine site and by re-routing the channel of Lower Robinson Creek around the mine. 
Possible contamination of surface water from stormwater runoff exposed to the Tropic 
Shale will be avoided by capturing any water on the mine site in impoundments, rather 
than letting it flow offsite. The mining plan includes contingencies for installing 
impermeable barriers should large flows of groundwater appear in the mine pits. All of 
these features, described in detail in the permit application, form a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the mine has been designed to prevent damage to the hydrologic balance. 
Id. at pp. 7-51 through 7-104. (Addendum 16.) 
Here, the Mine Permit is entirely located on private land where Utah statutes and 
regulations are the operative and governing law. Petitioners erroneously frame their 
CHI A argument as a matter of law, claiming that the Utah State agencies were bound, as 
a matter of law, to conform their CHI A analysis to mere guidance and interpretations 
issued by the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM). Under SMCRA, Utah is a 
primacy state that retains "exclusive jurisdiction over nonfederal lands" in the regulation 
of surface mining operations. Utah Code § 40-10-2 (stating that the purpose of UCMRA 
is to "grant to the Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining the necessary authority to 
assure exclusive jurisdiction over non-federal lands"); Castle Valley Spec. Serv. Dist. v. 
Bd.ofOil Gas & Mining, 938 P.2d 248, 251-52 (Utah 1997). 
The federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA") 
authorizes the Secretary of Interior, through the OSM, to review and approve or 
disapprove state regulatory programs for controlling surface mining operations. 30 U.S.C. 
§1211(c)(1) (2006). Upon the approval of a State program, section 503 of SMCRA (30 
U.S.C. § 1253) grants the State exclusive jurisdiction for the regulation of surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations on non-federal lands within such State. See Pa. Fedn. 
of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess. 297 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. Pa. 2002); Haydo v. 
Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 437 (3rd Cir. 1987); West Virginia Highlands 
Conservancy v. Huffman, 588 F. Supp.2d 678 (N.D. W.Va. 2009), aff d, 625 F.3d 159 
(4th Cir. 2009). State programs, consisting of state statutes and regulations, are the 
operative and governing law in primacy states. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition, Inc. v. 
Apogee Coal Co., LLC, 555 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 (S.D. W. Va. 2008); see 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1253. 
The Secretary of the Interior first approved the Utah state regulatory program on 
January 21, 1981, giving Utah exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations on non-federal lands. 30 C.F.R. § 944.10 (2010). 
Petitioners' reliance on federal authorities fails because "[ejxclusive, in other words, 
means just that - 'exclusive.' It does not mean 'parallel' or 'concurrent.'" Pa. Fedn. of 
Sportsmen's Clubs, 297 F.3d at 318. Either federal law or state law regulates coal mining 
activity in state, but not both simultaneously. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 
289 (4th Cir. 2001); see 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a), 1254(a). Utah retains "exclusive 
jurisdiction over nonfederal lands" for the regulation of surface coal mining and 
reclamation operations on private lands within the State. Utah Code § 40-10-2. 
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Under UCMRA, the Division must prepare a Cumulative Hydrologic Impact 
Assessment ("CHIA") that assesses the "probable cumulative impact" of the proposed 
mine when combined with any existing coal mines and all anticipated mines in the area.,J> 
Utah Code §§ 40-10-10(2)(c)(i)(C), 40-10-1 l(2)(c). The CHIA is prepared based upon 
the applicant's statement of the probable hydrologic consequences of mining and its 
measurements of the water resources in the permit and adjacent areas. § 40-10-(2)(c)(i). 
The permit's approval must include a finding, based on the CHIA, that the mine has been 
designed to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area. 
§ 40-10-1 l(2)(c). The Board's rules require that the CHIA shall be "sufficient to 
determine, for purposes of permit approval whether the proposed coal mining and 
reclamation operation has been designed to prevent material damage to the hydrologic 
balance outside the permit area." Utah Admin. Code R645-301-729.100 (2010). 
In the case before the Board, Petitioners did not challenge any of these things. 
Instead, they rooted their opposition in a mere belief that, in addition to the statutory and 
regulatory standards just set forth, every CHIA must set forth so-called "material damage 
criteria" for each parameter included in the water monitoring plan. Petitioners urged the 
Board to reject threshold standards established by the Division and articulated in the 
CHIA. They asserted that these standards were an inferior type of criterion because they 
triggered inquiry into whether material damage had occurred, rather than mandating the 
In this case, the mine is the first in the area and there are no other mines existing or 
anticipated. See Utah Admin. Code R645-100-200 (limiting the definition of 
"cumulative impact area" to mines existing, permitted, or applied for.) 
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conclusion that it already had. Petitioners offered neither statute nor rule in support of 
their position, relying instead on a pastiche of federal agency interpretive materials. On 
appeal, Petitioners challenge the rational basis for the Board's acceptance of the CHIA 
with its flexible material damage criteria rather than the rigid criteria they demanded, and 
complain that the Board erred as a matter of law in upholding the Division's CHIA 
without rigid material damage criteria. 
Applying the correct legal standard for determining whether the CHIA is adequate, 
the Board agreed with the Division that the mine had been designed to prevent material 
damage to the hydrologic balance, and that the CHIA contained sufficient information 
and analysis to serve that purpose. (R. 5611-15 ffl[ 137, 163-65.) The Board also found 
that the circumstances supported using flexible criteria and setting them at the levels the 
Division had chosen, (R. 5611-12 <|fl| 140-46.) As a matter of law, the Board declined to 
construe its rule to require a CHIA to also set forth rigid material damage criteria as 
demanded by Petitioners. (R. 5615 ^ 167.) 
The following sections explain that (1) the Board properly declined to set aside the 
permit based upon this purported flaw in the CHIA because it determined that the CHIA 
satisfied the relevant statutory standards; (2) The Board did not err in not declining to 
construe the statute to require designating rigid material damage criteria rather than 
For simplicity in this brief, Alton will refer to the material damage criteria designated 
by the Division in the CHIA as "flexible" material damage criteria, because they set a 
trigger for further inquiry into whether material damage was imminent. Alton will refer 
to the type of material damage criteria advocated by Petitioners as "rigid" criteria because 
they would trigger a conclusion that material damage had already occurred. 
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flexible criteria; and (3) substantial evidence supports the Board's findings regarding the 
mine's design relative to the hydrologic balance. 
A. The Board did not abuse its discretion by upholding the Division's 
finding that the mine was designed to prevent material damage to 
water resources 
To be adequate, a CHIA must be sufficient to determine if the proposed mine has 
been designed to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit 
area. R645-301-729.100. Because the Board is applying its own rule to the facts before 
it, in a technical area squarely within its expertise, the Board is in a better position than 
this Court to determine whether the CHIA is sufficient, and the Court should defer to the 
Board's rational decision. 
The record contains a rational basis supporting the Board's conclusion that the 
CHIA, containing flexible material damage criteria corresponding to the probable 
hydrologic consequences, was adequate to determine whether the mine had been 
designed to prevent damage to the hydrologic balance. This rational basis is adequately 
expressed in the Board's Interim and Final Orders, and is apparent within the CHIA 
document itself. (See R. 5464-66 (Addendum 13) (Interim Order); R. 5610-17 
(Addendum 11) (Final Order); R. at Hrg. Ex. D23 (CHIA)). 
The Board found that the mine had been designed to prevent hydrologic damage, 
and found that the CHIA disclosed an adequate technical basis for that factual finding. 
(R. 5611-16 ffil 138, 145-47, 162-65, 172-74.) A key point in that rational basis was the 
Division's concern, expressed in the CHIA, that runoff from the mine site, if not 
controlled, could degrade surface water quality in the form of higher levels of total 
dissolved solids ("TDS"). (R. Hrg. Ex. D23 at 28-30, 40.) Accordingly, the mine was 
in 
designed to capture all runoff within the mine site, resulting in zero discharge, at any 
level of TDS, to the hydrologic balance beyond the permit area. (R. 5613 ^ 152; R. 5883 
at 750:10-23. Addendum 11, 19.) Petitioners' expert witness on this subject testified 
that he had no basis to question the efficacy of this measure at preventing material 
damage because he had not evaluated either the mine's design or the site's hydrogeology. 
(R.5883 at 718:2-20, 738:1-7. Addendum 20.) The Board rationally concluded based on 
the uncontroverted evidence before it that no discharge would occur from the site. (R. 
5613 at ^ 152.) It agreed with the Division that the mine had been designed to prevent 
damage outside the permit area manifesting itself as increased TDS attributable to mine 
discharges. (R. 5613 at j^ 153.) This conclusion is fully rational in light of the mine's 
zero-discharge design, and providing rigid material damage criteria (either in the CHIA 
or the Board's findings of fact) would have added nothing to the required analysis. 
Under the appropriate rational basis standard of review Petitioners' challenge must fail. 
Petitioners" argument is based in a theory that only rigid material damage criteria 
can contribute to a rational basis for finding the mine to be properly designed. They 
offer neither statute nor rule in support of that position, and the Board found that the 
Petitioners' challenge to the CHIA, which was framed in different terms before the Board 
than on appeal, evidenced nothing more than a difference of opinion among technical 
experts.15 (R. 5616 |^ 173.) Petitioners' hydrology expert failed to persuade the Board 
15
 At the hearing, Petitioners' framed their CHIA issues differently, complaining (1) that 
the CHIA failed to set a damage criterion for each monitored parameter, and (2) that the 
material damage criterion for TDS had been set at an inappropriate level in light of Utah 
water quality standards. (See R. 1410-11 ^] 10-1 l)(Petitioners' designation of issues to 
be heard). While they now fault the Board, in the abstract, for making less thztn exacting 
findings and conclusions regarding site-specific material damage criteria, Petitioners are 
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that the Division's CHIA fell short of sound scientific practice. The Board made it 
abundantly plain in its Orders that it relied more heavily on evidence presented by the 
Division's and Alton's experts, finding Petitioners' expert neither helpful nor convincing. 
(R. 5612-161fl[ 149-51, 157-58, 172-73.) There is no basis for the Court to disturb that 
reasonable conclusion. 
B. The Board did not err in concluding that "material damage criteria" 
triggering enforcement action need not be included in this CHIA 
Petitioners also frame their CHIA argument as a matter of law, claiming that the 
State of Utah is bound, as a matter of law, to conform its CHIA analysis to guidance and 
interpretations issued by the federal Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and 
Enforcement ("OSM"). This argument misrepresents the statutory scheme. OSM is 
responsible for evaluating proposed state programs for consistency, and has oversight 
powers should state programs fall short. Because OSM has approved Utah's program, 
Utah has exclusive jurisdiction over coal mining in the state. See 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a); 30 
C.F.R. § 944.10. Because Utah has attained primacy, its state program, consisting of 
Utah statute and regulations, is the operative and governing law in Utah. Castle Valley 
Spec. Serv. Dist. v. Bd. of Oil Gas & Mining, 938 P.2d 248, 251-52 (Utah 1997); see 30 
U.S.C. § 1253 (2006). Parallel provisions of SMCRA and OSM's regulations 
accordingly "drop out" for purposes of regulation within the state. See Bragg v. W. Va. 
Coal Assn., 248 F.3d 275, 289 (4th Cir. 2001). 
entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law only on issues in which they sought the 
Board's decision. 
1. The plain language of the Utah statute and rules does not 
require that a CHIA include material damage criteria 
The CHIA is adequate with or without rigid material damage criteria because no 
statute or rule requires the Division to identify such criteria in the document. Under the 
Utah Coal Program UCMRA defines the CHIA's purpose, and the Board's rule provides 
a standard for determining adequacy. See Utah Code § 40-10-1 l(2)(c) (purpose); Utah 
Admin. Code R645-301-729.100 (standard). The plain language of neither gives any 
indication that the CHIA is inadequate without Petitioners' suggested rigid material 
damage criteria. Id. As Petitioners note, "material damage to the hydrologic balance" is 
not a defined term in statute or rule. There is also no definition for what constitutes a 
proper material damage criterion, which is not surprising because no statute or rule 
mentions such criteria. Petitioners' argument that such criteria are required "as a matter 
of law" accordingly fails because the plain language of no statute or rule can fairly be 
read to incorporate the requirement. 
2. In light of appellants' failure to show that the law is ambiguous, 
their resort to federal interpretive materials in an attempt to 
show noncompliance with state law is improper 
Petitioners urge this Court to look beyond the plain language of statute or rule and 
substitute statements appearing in federal interpretive materials for the binding provisions 
of the Utah Coal Program. There is no justification for doing so. This Court has 
consistently refrained from turning to such materials unless the plain language of the 
operative law is ambiguous. T-Mobile USA Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 2011 UT 28, 254 P.3d 
752 at % 21 ("If the plain language is unambiguous, we do not look to other interpretive 
tools.") In this instance, both statute and rule indicate that a CHIA is adequate for 
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purposes of permit approval if it is sufficient to determine whether the mine has been 
designed to prevent hydrologic damage. Utah Code § 40-10-1 l(2)(c); Utah Admin. Code 
R645-301-729.100. 
There are as many ways to satisfy this standard as there are ways to design a mine, 
but the standard itself is unambiguous—sufficiency is determined by the CHIA's utility 
in evaluating the mine's design. For purposes of this Court's review, facts appearing 
unchallenged in the record provide the necessary information to determine that the plain 
language has been satisfied without resort to any interpretive material. In short, because 
the agency was able to make a reasonable determination, based on the CHIA, that the 
mine was properly designed, the legal inquiry is at an end based on the rule's plain 
language. 
The authorities cited by Petitioners do not mandate enforcing either the Federal 
Register interpretation of the federal OSM rule or the federal draft CHIA guidance as 
standards for determining the sufficiency of the CHIA document. These authorities go no 
further than to address the degree of consistency between corresponding federal and state 
statutes or rules. See Brown v. Red River Coal Co., 373 S.E.2d 609, 610 (Va. Ct. App. 
1988) (statutes); Schultz v. Consol. Coal. Co., 475 S.E.2d 467, 475-76 (W.Va. 1996) 
(regulations). Neither speaks to the binding effect of federal agency positions set forth in 
either the Federal Register or draft guidance documents as Petitioners assert in this 
appeal. In any event, both decisions are called into serious question by the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Bragg that approval of a state coal regulatory program effectively 
sidelines federal regulation unless and until the Secretary elects to formally exercise his 
oversight authority and require the state program's modification or relinquishment. 
Bragg, 248 F.3d at 289, see 30 C.F.R. § 733 (setting procedures for reasserting federal 
jurisdiction in primacy states). 
Petitioners also vastly overstate the "mandate" for material damage criteria 
purportedly set forth by OSM in the Federal Register. In the most recent Federal Register 
material cited by Petitioners, OSM acknowledges that its CHIA regulations do not 
unequivocally mandate establishment of material damage criteria: "OSM stated in the 
Preamble to the 1983 hydrology regulations at page 43973 that 'OSM agrees that the 
[state] regulatory authorities should establish criteria to measure material damage for the 
purposes of the CHI As.' However, the CHIA regulation does not mandate that States do 
s o . . . . Further, in the 25 years since the hydrology rules were revised OSM has not put 
States on notice . . . of an obligation to establish material damage criteria." Office of 
Surface Mining, West Virginia Regulatory Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,970, 78,974 (Dec. 
24, 2008) (Addendum 8). Responding to specific comments that West Virginia's 
proposed rules were defective for failing to establish criteria for determining damage to 
the hydrologic balance, OSM was unequivocal: "[The commenter] vastly overstates the 
Federal mandate. No such mandate is contained in SMCRA or the Federal regulations . . 
. ." IcL at 78,977. While encouraging "some type of damage threshold and impact 
measures" (Id. at 78,974) OSM has consistently left the exact form and effect of these 
thresholds within the ambit of state discretion and flexibility. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 
43,955, 43,973 (Sep. 26, 1983) (Addendum 9). In light of the Federal agency's own 
denial of a firm mandate, and its consistent deference to state flexibility in this area, there 
is no reason "as a matter of law" to disturb the Division's reasonable decision to employ 
flexible criteria for evaluating possible material damage in the CHIA. 
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Petitioners' reliance on OSM's draft guidelines in this appeal is equally flawed. 
At the hearing below, Petitioners' expert acknowledged that in the 25 years since OSM 
prepared the draft, no final version has been published. (R. 5883 at 711:3-23.) The draft 
guidelines themselves expressly disclaim any regulatory mandate: 
These suggestions and procedures should be considered guidelines and not 
standards. The regulatory authority is not required to use this material. This is an 
advisory document and should not be construed as being regulatory in any way. 
There are no limits or conditions specified except those contained in the Act itself 
and in the promulgated Federal regulations and approved State programs. 
(R. Hrg. Ex. D26 at 1. Addendum 21.) Accordingly, there is no legal basis for importing 
the "suggestions" of these materials as legally-binding standards for Utah permits.16 
There is no basis for enforcing mere suggestions appearing in interpretive 
materials "as a matter of law." First, Petitioners have not shown that resort to the Federal 
Register or draft guidelines is needed because of ambiguity in the applicable plain 
language of any statute or rule. The plain language is sufficient for this Court's 
determination because the Board set forth a rational basis for finding its requirement to be 
satisfied. Second, the Federal Register materials cited by Petitioners stop well short of 
mandating the rigid material damage criteria Petitioners demand, permitting case-by-case 
and state-by-state flexibility. Finally, the draft guidelines relied upon expressly disclaim 
any binding regulatory purpose. For these reasons, the interpretive materials proposed by 
Petitioners should be disregarded. 
16
 To the extent that OSM's Draft Guidance is relevant, Alton notes that the Board found 
the Division's use of flexible material damage criteria, under these circumstances, to be 
consistent with the Guidance. (R. 5613-14 at ^ 158.) 
V. THE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING PLAN WAS ADEQUATE 
As mentioned above, the actual water resources in and around the Coal Hollow 
Mine are not extensive. The Mine has been designed with effective measures that 
prevent up-gradient water resources from being diminished if they enter the mine, and 
prevent water from leaving the mine and mingling with down-gradient resources. In 
addition, the Operations Plan sets forth remedial or preventive measures triggered by 
observations that water is entering and interacting with the site. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at 
\Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005YVolume 7.pdf, p. 7-24 through 7-34, 7-73 
through 7-100. Addendum 16.) Finally, Alton's monitoring plan is extensive, especially 
for a mine of this size. The monitoring plan sets forth no fewer than 54 locations in and 
around the one-square-mile mine site where water resources are measured four time each 
year, with the results promptly provided to the Division (and the public) for review. (R. 
Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, p. 7-57 though 
7-59, Tables 7-4 through 7-7B.) 
Under the Utah Coal Program, an applicant for a coal mining permit must satisfy 
two distinct data collection duties with respect to water resources: First, the applicant 
must obtain and submit adequate baseline data documenting the state of hydrologic 
resources before they are disturbed by any mining. Utah Admin. Code R645-301-724; 
Utah Code § 40-10-10(2)(c)(i)(B). Second, the operator must collect hydrologic data at 
regular intervals so long as mining operations continue. R645-301-731.200. The 
operator is required, as part of the permit application, to state its plans for collecting and 
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evaluating this monitoring data so that the regulatory agency can be reasonably assured 
that impacts to the hydrologic balance can be assessed. R645-301 -731.211, 731.221. 
Petitioners fault Alton's permit application in three ways concerning the 
monitoring plan: First, they seek remand so that the applicant can reorganize its water-
monitoring information, contained in several locations throughout the permit application, 
under a single heading. Second, they complain that the plan is devoid of required 
information describing how data collected pursuant to the plan will be analyzed in order 
to draw conclusions about possible hydrologic impacts from mining. Third, with respect 
to Lower Robinson Creek, they assert that the Board's decision inadequately explains 
why it did not order the plan modified to address their concerns. 
A. The Board did not err by relying on information found under other 
headings in the mining and reclamation plan, or in other parts of the 
permit application package to determine that the manner of using 
monitoring data was adequately described 
The first complaint may be quickly dispatched because the Division and Board 
have been granted statutory discretion by the Legislature "to establish procedures and 
requirements for the preparation, submission, approval, denial, termination, and 
modification of applications for coal mining and reclamation permits . . . . " Utah Code 
§ 40-10-6(4). Accordingly, the manner in which material appearing in a permit 
application shall be organized is explicitly committed to the Division's and Board's 
17 
discretion. The Board found the plans to be adequate, even though some monitoring-
17 
Given that the rules at issue indicate that the monitoring plan shall be based on the 
PHC determination and "all baseline hydrologic, geologic, and other information in the 
permit application" it seems particularly irrational to insist that the applicant confine 
permissible descriptions of how these data will work together only to the monitoring plan 
heading. See Utah Admin. Code R645-301-731.212, 731.222. 
related information appeared in different portions of the total permit application package. 
(R. 5617-19 Tffi 176-81.) While Petitioners may complain about the convenience of this 
approach, or its accessibility to the layman, it is not disputed that the material is within 
the permit application package and there is nothing unreasonable or irrational about the 
manner in which it is set forth. Therefore, the Board's determination must stand. 
B. The Board did not err by finding the description of how hydrologic 
monitoring data may be used to be adequate 
Petitioners' second complaint is that the permit application fails to provide 
essential descriptions of how hydrologic monitoring data will be employed to detect the 
mine's impacts. The rules governing collection of surface and ground-water data both 
include a requirement for information describing how the data "may be used." Utah 
Admin. Code R645-301 -731.211, 731.222. While Petitioners style their argument as a 
question of fact, there is really no factual dispute. The Board was not called upon to 
decide whether particular language did, or did not appear in the permit application, but 
rather was asked to determine whether language indisputably contained within the permit 
application (or elsewhere in the record) met the requirement of the applicable rule. This 
presents a question involving the application of law to the facts, where the Board and 
Division act under an explicit grant of discretion, and an intermediate deferential standard 
of review is appropriate. 
Petitioners' scorn for the Division's and Alton's reliance on an implicit 
understanding of how monitoring data should be used, rooted in either the monitoring 
i & plan's language or the regulations, is unrealistic and unfair. The monitoring plan 
18
 Even if OSM's Preamble to its 1982 proposed rule were binding on the Board, 
Petitioners make too much of its call for a "narrative" describing how the monitoring data 
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speaks clearly and separately of pre-mining baseline data and post-mining monitoring 
data, and includes discussion of why post-mining monitoring sites were chosen to 
facilitate comparison. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \CoalJHollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 
025005\Volume 7.pdf, p. 7-57 through 7-59 (Addendum 16); R. 5619 at % 185.) There is 
nothing unreasonable or irrational in relying on the implication, therefore, that the 
monitoring plan would compare these "before" and "after" data sets in order to assess 
possible impacts. The structure of the hydrologic data collection rules makes the 
implication even more reasonable, because they require collection of these "before" and 
"after" data sets. Cp, R645-301-724 with R645-301-731.200. It is not unreasonable for 
an operator, preparing a monitoring plan, to do as Alton did, matching up postmining 
monitoring data yet to be collected with pre-mining baseline data already in hand, and 
leave the regulated public or informed citizen to infer the obvious—that the mine's 
impacts will be detected by comparing these data. 
The same is true of the mine's identification in the plan of a specific monitoring 
point as a source of "background" data. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal 
Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, p. 7-58.) The clear implication is that this point serves as 
an upstream, unaffected "control" against which related groundwater sites that are 
identified in the plan closer to the mine and possibly affected, will be compared. The 
manner of using these two sets of monitoring data to detect impacts is clear from the 
may be used, because the rule was not promulgated as OSM proposed. OSM dropped the 
requirement for a "narrative" from its final rule promulgated the following year. Cpi 47 
Fed. Reg. 27,727 (Jun. 25, 1982) wkh 48 Fed. Reg. 43,987 (Sep. 26, 1983) (Addendum 
9, 10). The applicable Utah rules track with the language of OSM's final rules. Utah 
Admin Code. R645-301-731.211, 731.222. 
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designation of a "background" data site. While reducing that understanding to an 
extended narrative might educate the neophyte, it is not unreasonable for the Board to 
refrain from imposing either burden on Alton.19 
Finally, the permit application describes specific data analysis methods that can be 
applied, primarily to assist the hydrologist in differentiating the mine's effects from those 
due to drought or other climatic conditions. The methods indisputably describe how the 
hydrologic monitoring data may be used. The Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index, for 
example, is identified in the permit application and in the CHIA as a tool thai may be 
used for analysis of monitoring data. Its application to the Coal Hollow project is 
described in the permit application. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 
025005\Volume 7.pdf, App. 7-1 p. 7.) Stiff Diagrams, which graphically interpret water 
quality data, also identified in the permit application, are used to trace possible sources of 
groundwater contamination. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal Hollow 
025005\Volume 7.pdf, at 7-7, 7-8, 7-13 and Appx 7-1, p. 13 and Fig. 14.) The utility of 
such a data-analysis tool in a mining application is obvious. As with the other tools and 
methods identified in the permit application, these are accepted data-analysis tools and 
techniques used by hydrologists to discriminate between natural and mining effects on 
water resources.20 Petitioners' complaint to this Court that Alton failed to alert the 
19
 Petitioners did not present a witness on this issue, relying upon cross examination of 
the Division's hydrologist. (R. 5882 at 484:4-7.) The Board found that Petitioners had 
failed to meet their burden of proving error in the Division's permit approval based on 
this issue. (R. 5618 If 182.) 
20
 Alton thoroughly discussed the application all of these tools in its pleadings to the 
Board, and the Board relied on Alton's discussion in reaching its decision. (See R. 5467-
68 (Addendum 11) (Board's Order); R. 5202-14 (Addendum 22) (Alton's Brief).) 
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Division, in its monitoring plan, that it would apply the same interpretive tools to 
postmining hydrology data, as it did to pre-mining data, is not justified by the Utah Coal 
Program and credits the reader with neither expertise nor common sense. 
Reference to the PHC determination is further substantial evidence of how the 
Board could reasonably conclude that information in the Permit Application outside the 
monitoring plan augments the description of monitoring-data usage. (R. 5619 |^ 185.) 
The PHC determination describes "short-term diminution in discharge rates from some 
seeps and springs in Sink Valley" as the only significant adverse hydrologic effect that 
might manifest itself during mining. (R. Hrg. Ex. Dl at \Coal_Hollow\MRP\Coal 
Hollow 025005\Volume 7.pdf, p. 7-24 (emphasis supplied)). "Diminution in discharge 
rates" is reasonably detected when the "after" flow measurements are less than the 
"before" measurements at seeps and springs in Sink Valley. Accordingly, this statement 
in the PHC makes explicit what is implied elsewhere in the permit application and tells 
the reader exactly what to look for in the monitoring data as it is collected. It is 
substantial evidence that supports the Board's finding on this issue. 
Petitioners' argument that the monitoring plan is inadequate because it fails to 
describe how monitoring data will be used to detect the unlikely effects of mining is off 
the mark. (Petr's Br. 46.) Because the monitoring plans, by rule, must be based upon 
the determination of probable hydrologic consequences, it is inconsistent to complain, as 
Even if relevant, Petitioners' "Exhibit A," appearing as item 26 in volume II of their 
Addendum, is inappropriate. The exhibit appears to have been prepared solely for this 
appeal, and is not a part of the record before the Board. Because it purports to address a 
disputed issue of fact but does not appear in the record below, it should be disregarded by 
the Court pursuant to Utah Code §40-10-30(4) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(k). 
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Petitioners do, that the plan fails to adequately address improbable consequences. See 
Utah Admin. Code R645-301-731.211, 731.221. Petitioners offered no challenge below 
to Alton's identification of probable hydrologic consequences. Accordingly, uncontested 
evidence in the record shows that the monitoring plan is based on the probable hydrologic 
consequences, and describes how the probable consequence to alluvial groundwater will 
be detected if it occurs. As a matter of law, Petitioners5 claim based on improbable 
consequences fails to demonstrate that the plans are inadequate to describe data usage 
because no requirement exists to employ monitoring data to detect possible but unlikely 
effects. 
Petitioners' complaint that descriptions are lacking of how identified data-analysis 
tools will be used clearly illustrates that this is not a question of whether the description is 
provided in the plan, but rather what level of detail and elucidation is sufficient to obtain 
permit approval. Petitioners failed to present any factual evidence to the Board regarding 
the efficacy of the PHDI, Stiff Diagrams, geochemical analyses, or other techniques 
(lumped by Petitioners under the heading of "related documents") to analyze monitoring 
data. Despite their failure, they now ask the Supreme Court, under the guise of 
substantial evidence review, to determine whether these hydrological tools and 
geochemical techniques were properly recognized by the Board as "descriptions of how 
the data may be used." Having declined to provide evidence below regarding these 
methods, or their alleged shortcomings, Petitioners are unable on appeal to point to any 
part of the record supporting their claims regarding the unsuitability of these methods. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Board must stand. 
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C. The Board's Orders adequately disclose its reasons for finding the 
monitoring plan to be adequate 
The Board's Orders in this matter adequately disclose a rational basis for 
upholding the permit approval based upon the water monitoring plan as submitted by 
Alton. The Board did not object to Alton's reliance on documents other than the mining 
and reclamation plan, or references to material within the mining plan but outside the 
hydrologic monitoring plan subsection, to provide information regarding use of 
monitoring data. (R. 5617-19 fflf 180, 181, 185.) The Board also did not object to 
reliance upon inferences drawn from the monitoring plan, or from the regulations, to 
supplement the basic information regarding data usage. (R. 5617 j^ 180.) The Board 
indicated its belief that the challenge to the adequacy of the monitoring plan implicated a 
question of degree, which leaves the question of how much detail on data usage would 
suffice to the Division's and Board's discretion. (R. 5466 (Observing in its interim order 
that "[t]he disagreement between the parties on this issue boils down to how explicit, 
specific and detailed the description must be to satisfy the . . . rule."); R. 5618 J^ 183 
(final order)). At Petitioner's urging, the Board analyzed the Alton monitoring plan in 
terms suggested by a U.S. Department of the Interior administrative law judge evaluating 
a permit ( under the Federal program for Tennessee, which has relinquished primacy) 
against a similar challenge and found that Alton's plan provided the key elements the 
ALJ had found lacking in Tennessee. (R. 5467 (noting that the Alton plan describes 
ctwhat each monitoring site is designed to monitor as well as the monitoring protocols to 
be used at each monitoring site")). Therefore, while the Board felt that an optional higher 
level of detail could have been supplied, there exists a rational basis apparent in the 
Board's Orders for concluding, as it did, that the Alton plan met the minimum 
requirements, including a description of how the data may be used. The Board's decision 
should not be disturbed. 
D. The Board did not err by finding the hydrologic monitoring plan for 
Lower Robinson Creek to be adequate 
Surface-water monitoring data, whether pre- or postmining (i.e. baseline or 
operational monitoring) must be "sufficient to demonstrate seasonal variation and water 
usage" and otherwise adequate to obtain the necessary data to assure protection of the 
hydrologic balance. R645-301-724.200, 731.220. The monitoring plan is to be based in 
the PHC statement and geologic, hydrologic and other information in the permit 
application considered in light of the approved postmining land uses. R645-301-731.221. 
No Utah (or federal) statute or rule mandates particular criteria for the number and 
location of sampling points or monitoring stations the applicant will employ to 
accomplish this task. 
At hearing Petitioners attempted to demonstrate that the plan for collecting 
baseline and monitoring data on Lower Robinson Creek was inadequate because it failed 
to sample this stream at the exact point where it crossed the permit boundaries. The 
Board found that the preponderance of evidence, consisting of expert testimony, did not 
establish any deficiency in this regard. (R. 5629-31 ffl[ 240-244, 251-259.) The 
testimony before the Board showed that gains or losses to the Creek between the sample 
points and the permit boundaries were insignificant. (R. 5885 at 1218:6-20; 1219:3-24. 
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 It is not true that Petitioners' experts' testimony regarding "intervening hydrologic 
influences" went undisputed. (See Petr's Br. at 48.) Alton's expert testified that these 
tributaries were inconsequential because they drained a "dry hillside." (R. 5885 at 
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Addendum 19.) Even though Petitioners' expert offered his legal interpretation that the 
rules require locating sample points at permit boundaries, he did not know whether any 
monitoring plan he had ever participated in actually did so. (R. 5885 at 1163:21-1165:1. 
Addendum 23.) As with the CHI A issue, the Board determined that this issue presented 
nothing more than a difference of opinion among experts. (R. 5628 |^ 238.) The Board 
was not persuaded by Petitioners' expert, and found Alton's and the Division's experts to 
be more reliable and credible. (R. 5628-29 f^l] 239-42.) The record therefore contains 
substantial evidence that additional monitoring points on Lower Robinson Creek are 
unnecessary. 
On appeal Petitioners brush aside their own substantive evidentiary failure and 
fault the Board on procedural grounds for failing to identify those portions of the 
monitoring plan that account for the purportedly "missing" monitoring stations. This 
repackaged argument merely begs the question which Petitioners failed to prove below, 
viz., whether there was a need, through additional sampling points or otherwise, to 
account for the location of the upstream and downstream monitoring points relative to the 
permit boundaries. Because the Board found that no such imperative existed, its order 
cannot now be faulted for failing to identify how the monitoring plan accounts for the 
distance. The Board articulated a rational basis for finding the monitoring plan adequate, 
and Petitioners do not directly challenge that basis. The decision should be affirmed. 
1211:3-22. Addendum 19.) The Board found Petitioners' expert less reliable on this 
point. (R. 5629-29 ^ 239.) 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioners have demonstrated no error in the State's decision to grant the 
Coal Hollow Mine Permit, nor have they demonstrated to this Court any fault in the 
process by which the decision was made. The cultural resources in the area adjacent to 
the Mine were properly taken into account, the CHIA was prepared according to the 
appropriate legal standard, and the permit application contained adequate information 
regarding water-resource monitoring. Most important, Petitioners have shown no flaw in 
the rational basis for the Board's decision to uphold the permit. Petitioner's desire or 
opinion that Utah should perform its tasks differently, i.e. to suit the Petitioners' 
standards, is not the criterion for determining the sufficiency of the actions taken by the 
Division and the Board. The Board had sound, logical reasons for finding the CHIA and 
monitoring plans adequate, for declining to assert jurisdiction over a public road in a 
distant town, and for finding the adjacent cultural resources to be properly accounted for 
within its evaluation. In each case, the Board exercised its lawful discretion within 
reasonable bounds in light of all the facts and circumstances. Most importantly, 
Petitioners have identified no cultural and hydrologic resources that are subject to adverse 
effects as a result of the Mine's operations. Instead, their challenge to the permit, 
including this appeal, presents questions of how much information, and what type of 
analysis, must appear in the paperwork accompanying the approval. These issues are 
squarely within the discretion of the Division and Board, and their reasonable findings 
and conclusions should not be disturbed. The record shows that resources, plans and 
effects were all adequately disclosed, with sound reasons for the choices made. Nothing 
more is required, and the Board's decision should be affirmed. 
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